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0.  INTRODUCTION
This  article  treats  the  history  of  the  Hungarian  movement  that  emerged  in
opposition to the Gabcikovo(Bôs)-Nagymaros Barrage, attempting first of all to trace
the change in the field of conflict within this.  We follow this phenomenon through
the story which stretches over decades, and where from time to time new pairs of
actors step onto the stage, and the conflict developing between them appears to be
the main conflict in the whole matter.
A survey of the longer period of time serves up a few perhaps surprising lessons.
On the one hand, it becomes clear that the value of the crystallizing principles and
experiences of separate periods is limited, and that an examination of a longer time-
cycle in its entirety makes it possible to learn different lessons, for example the
parallel clarification of the events with great political fluctuations.  On the other
hand, it is worth noting that it is not at all certain that this always signals the real
conflicts of the period, as they are declared, and as they only appear to be at the
center of the events.
1.  PREHISTORY I, HYDRO-ENGINEERS VERSUS NATURE (UNTIL 1950)
The past century was the period of triumphant river control.  The Tisza, the
fickle running river meandering though the Great Hungarian Plain (=Alföld), was
first  controlled  by  cutting  the  windings,  then  by  straightening  the  channel,  thus
causing the water arriving on the Tisza to be prodded into leaving the Great Plain as
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century  --  to  make  it  possible  for  part  of  the  rushing  water  to  be  caught  in  the
reservoirs created in the arteries, that is, to make it recoverable.  In the case of the
Danube, in the last century, the most significant intervention on the lower stretch
took place at the Iron Gates, where the goal was to ensure navigability.  Besides this,
significant dead branches -- but not those connected with the main channel -- were
drained.
The  control,  and  the  rivers'  periodic  inundation  of  increasing  numbers  of
territories resulting from the water works connected with it, necessitated providing
for ever greater masses of water to move across the original channel by raising the
embankments.  Thus, in the end the danger of flooding became rarer in controlled
rivers, but on the other hand quantities of water that had not been experienced until
then,  and  mainly  water-levels,  formed,  endangering  territories  that  had  not
previously  been  affected  by  floods.    To  an  outsider,  the  problem  itself  became
absolutely  baffling,  while  precisely  these  floods  strengthened  the  water
management's position against others: it could sound the catastrophic danger alarm in
the face of every claim against the government.  But the fruits of this would ripen
only in a period to follow.
First, however, another strand of the story must be picked up -- the energy use of
rivers -- which is not, of course, a development independent of the river control.
Pre-World War I Hungary filled the entire Carpathian Basin, that is, the rivers'
alpine and high-incline sections also belonged to the country.  Whereas hydro-energy
needs not only a large volume of water, but also an appropriate slope and difference
in heights, first of all it was these alpine areas, with their precipitation, which were
taken  into  account  for  energy  production.    It  is  significant  that  the  territories
detached as a result of the 1920 Paris Peace Treaty included 94.5 percent of the
country's hydraulic power reserves.
In spite of this -- and this is in accordance with previous foreign examples --
throughout the period between the two world wars, Slovak and Hungarian water
management specialists continually called on their governments to accept one -- or
several -- Danube barrages as energy-creating works.  On the Slovak side, support
for the plan was not free of a territorial escalation: the Danube was precisely the
newly agreed state boundary between the two countries, but already at the peace
talks  Slovakia  would  have  liked  to  win  the  right  to  exclusive  use  of  the  river-
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2.  THE PLAN
Breaking the thread of the story, but in the interest of contributing to further
understanding, here we must interrupt with a technical description of how the main
player in the whole story, the Water Barrage, looks.
Leaving the Alps, the Danube falls about 50 meters along each 100 kilometers of
the Austrian stretch.  Along the full 417 kilometers of the Hungarian stretch, it falls
just about as much.  Arriving in the flat regions, the Danube slows down, deposits its
alluvia, and creates islands.  In these conditions, a dam built in the channel, even if it
dams  up  the  river  for  several  dozens  of  kilometers,  can  succeed  in  creating  a
difference in level of only a few meters.
The side-channel is intended to improve on this ratio.  In this case, the river
moves into an artificially constructed, asphalted canal, running parallel to the origin
channel, in which the mass of water, proceeding with a very small drop, will be
containable  at  the  side-branch  level.    For  this,  of  course,  the  side-channel
Figure 1.  General layout of the mid' Danube project
must be moved even further from the original ground-level, and a five-ten-fifteen
meter-high dam cap must be reached.  At the end of the dam will be the power
station: it will be used precisely when the mass of water returns from this level to the
level of the original channel.  Thus we will not be building a power station in the
river-channel, but rather next to and above it, and we will bring a river to it.  In the4F LEISCHER RESEARCH PERIPHERY BUDAPEST SÍP U. 6
concrete case, this side-channel was built on the Slovak side, and were about 20
kilometers in length.  (See Figure 1.)
In the case of the Gabcikovo power station, even this solution was not attractive
enough from the energy production point of view, so the plan had to be filled out in
such a way that in the peak period, that is in the morning and afternoon electric
energy peak consumption periods, the power works would be used to their maximum
capacity.  Thus it is necessary that the waters of the Danube be held back for half a
day, and then released to the power-station during the defined peak periods.  For this
-- also taking this into account from a technical-hydraulic point of view -- a reservoir
capable of holding about an average two-day flow of the Danube must be formed
above the power station.  This was the Dunakiliti reservoir, two-thirds of which
would be on Hungarian territory, one-third on Slovak, with the controlling sluices on
the Hungarian side.
The peak-time running, that is the power station's periodic operation, would not
change the water-flow relations only above the power-station, but also below it.  It is
not permissible that at those periods of the day when the power-station is not in
operation the section of river below the power-station would in essence be emptied.
That is why a second dam is necessary, with the help of which the stretch after the
first power-station -- the so-called sub-water -- would also become controllable.  In
our  case,  this  second  dam  is  the  Nagymaros  dam,  which  falls  on  the  Hungarian
stretch of the Danube, where the Danube is thus already not a border-river.
3. PREHISTORY II, WATER MANAGEMENT VERSUS GOVERNMENT (1950-75)
Let's jump back into the period preceding the concrete plans.  Notwithstanding
the significant proportion of the chronology of the period 1950 to 1975 devoted to
international  negotiations  (Czechoslovak-Hungarian,  Soviet-Hungarian,  Austria-
Czechoslovak  and  Soviet-Czechoslovak  talks  following  one  another),  from  the
Hungarian point of view, two prime ministerial decisions can be considered as real
landmarks.  The first of these is in 1953, when Prime Minister Ernô Gerô, the second
man  in  the  Hungarian  party  leadership  being  confronted  with  an  almost
accomplished fact dictated by preliminary water management talks, still rejects the
side-channel plan forming on the Slovak side; delaying by this action with 10 years
the hour when similar conception gets a signature on the government commissioner
level.  The second landmark of the period is 1975, when the Hungarian Council of
Ministers accepts the plan put before it, which is in essence the version still debated
today and briefly introduced above.  From here, a straight road leads to the 1977
signing of the inter-governmental agreement.
Meanwhile,  in  the  two  decades  that  have  elapsed,  the  Hungarian  water
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70,000 people) and its powerful position has been strengthened.  The key element in
this  has  been  the  "good  management"  appropriate  to  floods  at  all  times,  that  is,
cleverly  making  use  of  the  period  of  flooding  danger  in  the  intragovernmental
bargaining positions.  The Danube barrage itself runs just as a sort of side show for
most of the period; its preparation is reported not through open planning, but rather
by  the  professional  representation  at  the  international  talks  on  the  matter,  and
through  hints  hidden  in  the  international  specialists'  declarations.    Meanwhile,  a
barrage is completed on Hungary's second biggest river, the Tisza (1954, at Tiszalök)
and yet another reservoir comes under construction (at Kisköre in 1973), which to
this day has not been filled entirely.
Probably  everywhere  in  the  world  there  are  provisions  in  the  records  of  the
contracts of large state investments as to what must be kept secret, and for how long.
It is, of course, in the government's interest that before it commits itself, it should
have  its  position  checked  by  as  wide  a  professional  openness  as  possible.    The
investor thus has to endeavour to get the government interested in secretiveness.  It is
very useful for this if behind the investment, military and strategic interests can be
marched  out.    In  Eastern  Europe  even  less  than  this  was  enough;  indeed  it  was
enough that "foreign interests," "energy considerations" or something similar enter
the package, really anything for which it would be better if it did not end up coming
to the attention of mere mortals cut off from the culture of great politics, for "they
would hardly understand anyway."  In itself, however, this would have been too little
without such a great political turn, when the government virtually has begun looking
for an opportunity to be able to demonstrate its resolution.
Today it would be difficult to reconstruct exactly and in detail what background
considerations led to the political hardening and conservative workers power wave
coinciding in the period 1974-1977, when the agreement to accept the plan came
about relatively smoothly.  Still, as they say, it is no coincidence that this occurred
precisely in a period when a centrally directed force to return order was gathering
strength in opposition to the limited economic reforms unfolding since 1968; when
sociologists  who  began  to  connect  social  problems  with  the  peculiarities  of  the
political  regime  were  forced  into  emigration;  and  when  the  (one-)party  ideology
declared in opposition to the economists that the impact of the oil price explosion
could not affect the socialist countries.  They could not affect them: yet still, in
strange parallel, while for example in France the atomic lobby succeeded in gaining
acceptance of large-scale atomic energy plans, in our country the plan for the barrage
arrived on the threshold of signing.
Neither the hard-line communist politicians nor others yet guessed how perfectly
the plan that had come into existence would serve as a model for the circumstances
of production, and how this symbolism would shortly become capable of taking on a
life of its own.6F LEISCHER RESEARCH PERIPHERY BUDAPEST SÍP U. 6
4. WATER MANAGEMENT + GOVERNMENT VERSUS PROFESSIONAL OPPONENTS (1977-
84)
It is a fact that even the limited professional openness could meet with a few
opposing opinions only a good while after the signing of the agreed plan.  These
points of view were represented at professional talks or critiques by a few specialists
who generally were not tied directly to the water management: one was an engineer
working on the capital's civil engineering, one was a railway engineer, and one a
hydro-biologist at an academic research institute, but in connection with discrete
problems  of  detail,  from  1980  on  several  employees  of  the  Scientific  Research
Institute of Water Management also were involved.
It must be noted that the professional critiques did not call into question the fact
of the barrage's construction or of the objective of energy production.  They aimed
instead  at  the  improvement  of  individual,  mistaken,  partial  solutions  and  at
supplementing individual tests that had been left out.  It would be difficult, naturally,
to answer "what would have happened if" the planners of the investment project had
paid attention to the criticisms, treated them as professional proposals, and opened
them up for debate.  In any case, this would have meant not only another investment
project, but another story, too.
In any case, when in 1981 biologist János Vargha, a journalist  of  the  Búvár
(=Diver) nature-protection monthly, introduced with the theme, for him it was not
the professional debating points that brought the first shock, but rather the realization
that the matter was full of hurt, shelved people, silent and silenced opinions, and
publications  that  had  been  laid  aside.    There  was  still  no  question  of  water
management, environment or energy: it was simply a political affair that steamrolled
ahead, grinding opposing opinions beneath it.  The tools of repression were out of all
proportion to the weight of the opposing opinions: really, it was precisely this that
betrayed how the plans' partisans feared that the system, improvised with difficulty
as it was, could show how weak their base was.
At the time it was obvious to the competent circles of government that something
was not right.  In 1981, everything was done to slow down the preparations: the
Economic  Committee  passed  a  decision  by  which  the  Hungarian-Czechoslovak
Economic  and  Technical-Scientific  Cooperation  Committee  would  agree  on
interrupting  the  construction  of  the  barrage  system.    Again,  the  Kádár-era
dictatorship entered a "softer," more sober period, the second oil price explosion of
1979-80  in  the  end  forced  the  leadership's  mistaken  strategy  of  the  1970s  to  be
brought under control, and the word and weight of economic specialists within the
government temporarily grew.  As to the power station, the examinations began in
1978, with the announcement of a Gyôr-Sopron County Central People's Supervisory
Committee on the insufficiencies of the plan. In 1979 and 1980, the debate continued
in various committees or programs of the Patriotic People's Front, the HungarianTHE CASE OF THE MIDDLE DANUBE HIDROELECTRIC DAM 7
Hydrological  Society,  and  the  Association  of  Technical  and  Natural  Sciences
Societies.
After this, all the way up to the middle of 1983, the various scientific committee
investigations followed one after another.  Among others, the National Technical
Development  Committee  and  the  National  Environmental  and  Nature  Protection
Office prepared opinions, and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences also was asked to
for its position.  In a peculiar way, in most of the committees decisive roles were
played  by  university  specialists  or  specialists  from  banks  with  an  interest  in  the
construction, and the opinions that were emerging were at least not unambiguous.
The  struggle  within  the  government  continued.    Not  even  waiting f o r  t h e
announcement of a few preparatory committees, in summer 1983 the Hungarian-
Czechoslovak  Economic  and  Technical-Scientific  Cooperation  Committee  took  a
position siding with continuation of the construction works, and then in the fall the
agreement was signed at the heads of government level.
In December, the viewpoint of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences presidency,
which sided with postponing or completely cancelling the investment, was ready.
But since politics had, however, already gone beyond this, the decision was kept
secret, and the Academy itself could not publicize it.
5.  WATER MANAGEMENT + GOVERNMENT VERSUS GERMS OF THE MOVEMENT (1984-
1988)
By the beginning of 1984, the Water Management felt as if it had won the battle.
Behind its back, a political decision was taken to begin an information campaign.
But even here, however, they wanted to avoid a real debate: when on January 27,
1984, the deputy office director of the National Water Management Office was to
debate with János Vargha, at the last moment the Office renounced the debate to
which it had previously agreed.
In place of the debate, János Vargha told everything he knew about the barrage.
Numerous specialists attended the presentation as listeners and commentators, and
they told how they had been set aside through every means.  Afterwards, a few from
the audience stayed behind, and they decided to initiate a movement, an educational
and signature-collecting campaign to call attention to the dangers of the barrage.
This moment can be considered the birth of the Danube movement.  It is remarkable
that in the same year, the Hungarian Architects' Association took a position at its
general meeting calling for reconsideration of the barrage system, and the Budapest
City  Builders'  Association  and  the  Communist  Youth  League  committee  of  the
Eötvös Loránd University's Humanities Faculty also made an appeal.8F LEISCHER RESEARCH PERIPHERY BUDAPEST SÍP U. 6
Until May, clubs from many Budapest universities and institutes offered space
for  the  debates  organized  by  the  new  movement.    It  turned  out  that  the  Water
Management was unable to produce presenters capable of debating.  They ordered an
"information  embargo"  to  avoid  further  struggles.    (Later,  in  many  cases,  they
alluded to the fact that they had been blocked from informing the population about
the advantages of the investment.)  The information embargo naturally affected every
publication connected with the barrage.
Thus  by  the  middle  of  1984,  it  was  obvious  to  the  Water  Management  that
political support was not enough to defend the construction in open, "democratic"
debates.    Every  further  effort  to  move  the  construction  along  was  made  in  this
knowledge.  The defense of the compromised economic policymakers was always
the "sincere" surprise: they did not know, if they had known, etc.
In the beginning, the movement targeted these "sincere" decisionmakers.  The
starting strategy was to seize every legal means, offer petitions, and ask for official
permission to operation.  These tactics forced the authorities to decide they could not
play the well-meaning and misled anymore.  It is true, meanwhile, that even without
this they were inclined to a tougher stance.  Successfully surviving the beginning of
the 1980s (avoiding the payments crisis that threatened) made the holders of power
conceited, and in preparation for their new party congress those who felt they had
given too wide a sway to more liberal economic policies gained the upper hand.  It
was time to tighten the reins.  But the mid' 1980s cannot be compared with the
situation 10 years earlier: Gorbachev's Soviet Union, for example, cannot be used as
such a basis of authority as Brezhnev's, and the conceived hard line turned out to be
softer than planned.
During  the  first  half  of  1984,  the  movement  gathered  more  than  10,000
signatures for a letter to the Parliament and government urging postponement of the
construction and the elaboration of new plans.  At the same time, the struggle for
registration  as  an  official  association  began,  for  which  the  official  organs  were
unprepared.  For all they knew was that they did not want to register the movement.
Thus, they tried to buy time through a method not yet recorded in law, by trying to
debate over competence, and in the end, after a change of personnel they throw out
the prior spoken agreement.
The name Danube Circle first appeared at this time on various documents and
newsletters.  This branch of the movement was supported by specialists opposing the
construction, that, beside the presence of János Vargha ensured acquaintance with
the prior history and its continuation.  The Danube Circle also developed foreign
ties; indeed, in October 1985, János Vargha and the Danube Circle won the annual
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The  official  media  reacted  to  the  prize  with  a  prohibition.    (This  fact  itself
characterized the situation: on the one hand, the Information Office or the party's
Central Committee could bring to the attention of the editors of every press organ,
periodical and other media what was not permitted to transmit -- and on the other
hand, they complied with this!)  At the same time, it became ever more clear to the
authorities that silence was not enough.  They wanted to make the activity which the
movement conducted their own, and transform it.
Still,  as  long  as  the  population's  right  to  learn  the  opinions  tied  with  the
environment  was  not  recognized,  naturally  organizations  could  not  be  formed  to
control the activity from above.  At one and the same time, "pioneer" steps had to be
taken by the authorities to accept environmental problems raised by the society, and
brand or consider to be not existing the movement forming really from below.  In
1984, an "umbrella" organization integrating environmental protection groups came
into being within the Communist Youth League.  This was followed in 1986 by an
Environmental  Protection  Council  in  the  Federation  of  Technical  and  Natural
Sciences Associations, which wanted to draw together, channel and take in hand the
professional-type social expression of views connected with the environment.  In the
end, in 1988, when the Danube Circle again applied for official registration as a
national association, within weeks the "Hungarian Environmental Protection Union"
was  hobbled  together  under  the  aegis  of  the  Patriotic  People's  Front  which,
monopolizing the problem-field, according to the official conception and declaration,
would be made responsible for every other, national-level, that is not territorially-
limited,  environmental  protection  organization.    The  action,  how e v e r ,  w a s  s o
amateurish that already at its founding sessions, with their exclusivist organization
and choice of invitees on a political basis, the organizations managed to discredit
themselves.
The sequence of events of these years would not be completely comprehensible
without having a look around.
In  fall  1984,  a  Czechoslovak-Austrian  debate  about  a  power-station  being
negotiated  on  the  stretch  of  Danube  under  Vienna  came  to  attention  on  the
diplomatic level.  The Czechoslovak side favored joint use of the hydraulic power,
and recommended building the power station near Bratislava.  The Austrian side,
however, weighed in with the choice of Hainburg, which lies on  the completely
Austrian  stretch.    In  spite  of  the  preparations  underway,  Prague  made  official
protests,  referring  to  the  destruction  of  the  ecological  balance  and  the  danger  of
flooding  in  Bratislava.    The  Austrian  environmentalists  stepped  forward  strongly
against the destruction of the flood-plain forests, to which the government answered
by  bringing  in  the  police,  in  scandalous  circumstances.    This  road  could  not,
however, be followed, and the Austrian government suspended the works, cancelling
the power station once and for all.10 FLEISCHER RESEARCH PERIPHERY BUDAPEST SÍP U. 6
With this, the Austrian construction industry interested in building the barrage
was left without work.  This played a big role in the fact that in 1985, preparation of
a  second  agreement  accelerated:  at  Nagymaros,  the  works  performed  by  the
Hungarian side were to be completed by Austrian firms with Austrian state credit
guarantees, which the Hungarian side would repay for twenty years beginning in
1996 with electric energy produced in the power station (or from some other source).
The  Austrian  Greens  protested  alongside  the  Hungarian  movement  against
Austrian  participation  in  the  construction,  and  chiefly  against  the  government
support for this, and they took part in organizing many Hungarian protests.  Both in
1986 and 1987, the police liquidated (dispersed) Budapest environmental protests or
leafleting.  In the latter case, they arrested for a short time a few Austrian citizens
protesting against the construction of the power station.  But in spring 1988, the
situation was still the same.  Today it is already clearly evident -- while it was not so
obvious at the time -- that the weakening dictatorship's last display of strength was at
stake, when the police already was incapable of dealing with conflicts that could not
be handled by police means; but at the same time, the authorities were not capable of
dealing with them by other means, either.
6.  WATER MANAGEMENT + GOVERNMENT VERSUS POLITICAL OPPOSITION (1988-89)
In  1988,  the  Hungarian  leadership  was  trying  to  present  itself  as  reform
communist,  and  to  flirt  with  Europe  not  least  in  the  interest  of  upholding  the
economy.  At the same time, a decidedly conservative wing within the party brought
about the removal of János Kádár, whose person symbolized the past three decades,
This two dissonant facts caused daily tensions and contradictions.  One of the telltale
signs was the barrage itself: while the appearance of the social movements became
more freer, and the expression of views began to follow European patterns, the water
management affairs were entrusted to a newly created ministry.  The ministry was
brought into existence by merging the former Water Management Office and the
Environmental and Nature Protection Office, under the leadership of a high-level
conservative party official kicked down(!) to minister.  Here it was possible to create
a kind of island where the leaders could convince themselves that the changing times
did not affect them: over more than a year -- this is already visible with hindsight --
they brought to perfection in a caricaturish way the symbolism that the barrage as a
model of the rigid communist dictatorship had already expressed earlier.
The model worked to force the party apparatus and the Grósz government to
show their true colors.  Indeed, in fall 1988, after long and exhausting debates in the
press and on television, many spectacular open conferences, and a 30,000- strong
demonstration in front of the Parliament building, the parliament had to deal with the
power-station.  When after a sharp parliamentary debate the party that feverishly
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practice, in a peculiar way this gave the parliament final credentials not about the
barrage, but about itself: the Hungarian parliament had openly, spectacularly and
perfectly discredited itself.
After the decision, already in October, the demonstrations continued.  With them,
a  new  signature-collecting  movement  is  initiated  to  require  a  referendum  on  the
barrage affair.  In the wake of the action, at the end of February 1989, already the
movement could hand 140,000 signatures to the parliamentary president.
Miklós Németh, the reform communist prime minister taking office in December
1988 naturally sensed the tension, and he wanted to avoid in any way possible that a
referendum against the barrage should demonstrate the masses' dissatisfaction with
the regime.  As a first decisive step in his position, just through the barrage affair he
found  it  necessary  to  markedly  separate  himself  from  the  party  leadership  that
continued to bear the stamp of Károly Grósz.  Already in March, in the parliament he
was hinting at a necessary reexamination; then, on May 13, 1989, suspension of the
Nagymaros river works was announced at a government session.  The terminus of
the decision was fixed at a date two months later.
7.  GOVERNMENT VERSUS WATER MANAGEMENT (MAY 1989-APRIL 1991)
It  would  be  difficult  to  say  what  would  have  been  the  result  in  1989  if  a
referendum had really taken place.  Perhaps believers in the barrage were right to
think that they would have suffered a certain defeat as victims of a demonstration
against the regime.  In any case, the Nagymaros council president initiated a pretty
strange signature-collecting counter-campaign: signatures were  collected by water
management enterprises and offices from their own employees, protesting not only
against  suspension  of  the  construction  works,  but  also  against  there  not  being  a
referendum on the matter!
There was a short period, immediately after announcement of the suspension of
the construction work, when the representatives of the water management themselves
awaited further decisive measures.  High-ranking water management representatives
announced,  that  they  had  already  said...already  written...it  was  just
impossible....Afterwards, several weeks passed, but nothing happened.  Nobody was
moved,  nobody  responded  to  their  questions.    The  office-leader  who  previously
supervised the construction in the National Planning Office was named government
commissioner.  The specialists' committees were set up, and among these three water
management  specialists'  committees  were  formed  in  the  ministry  favoring
construction.  It turned out that everyone could still be present, and could continue
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True,  the  order  setting  up  the  committees  appointed  by  name  several
organizations, including the Danube Circle, to be brought into the work, but this
came to light only after the first meetings.  Thus, the movement representatives were
brought into work that had already been initiated and divided up.  In many instances,
massive compilations arrived with invitations for the next day; in others it emerged
at the meetings that new materials had been prepared in place of the ones that had
been sent out, and that these were to be discussed at the meeting.  The head of the
committee bringing together the economic analyses wanted to avoid sharp positions
in any case, and the costs of suspending or continuing construction somehow always
ended up to be just about the same.  If a mistake came out on one side, immediately a
correction was made on the other side, as well.  It is interesting that attempts similar
to  this  stalemate  generally  characterized  the  activity  tied  to  the  government
commissioner and the government.
Formally, only the Environmental Protection and Water Management portfolio
spoke  against  the  government  decision,  but  in  reality  the  government  carefully
arranged  that  only  neutral  steps  should  take  place:  it  is  true, t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e
Dunakiliti works should be suspended belonged to this; and that within half a year
the Austrian contract came to final settlement.  The original two-month decision-
making deadline formally was lengthened to twice that period; in reality, however, it
grew to three years: until May 1992, no step could be taken in the direction of either
destroying  or  building  further.    (Naturally,  the  bills  from  this  second  two  years
already were a burden to a different government.)
In  fall  1989,  the  government  commissioner  ordered  two  summaries o f  t h e
committee's statements, one from the Oviber investing group,  and  an  other  from
independent  specialists.    The  government  and  parliament  in  the  end  accepted  a
decision in which they assented to suspend the construction, but on the basis of the
committee's work they did not move in any direction, except for their position on the
need for further studies.
That fall, the reform wing of the communist party practically liquidated its own
party.  As a result of obviously mistaken judgment, it provoked such a vote at their
congress that at the end hardly five percent of the earlier membership joined the two
newly formed successor parties.  The Németh government similarly erred when it
measured their chances during the next elections: it can be said that its activity in
large part was subordinated to a previous image of popularity, and it failed to carry
out numerous steps which would have been in its power.  This kind of vacillation to
please everybody was characteristic of the government's position on the barrage, too.
To this can be attributed the prime minister's many progressive letters and exchanges
of  messages  with  the  Czechoslovak  head  of  government,  Marian  Calfa,  in  the
beginning of 1990, in which he wrote about the specifics more concrete as to the
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Slovak territory, and meanwhile the execution of the steps mentioned in the letter
was not initiated.
The movements that in 1988 stepped forward together against the barrage as the
Nagymaros  Committee,  now  were  branching  out  onto  different  roads.    The
Hungarian Democratic Forum became a party, which after the elections became the
governing party.  The entire membership of a few smaller groups, and elsewhere part
of  the  membership,  chose  direct  politicking  and  were  absorbed  into  the  political
parties.  Many personally took part in the not very successful formation of the Green
Party, occupied by continual internal political battles.  The period of forced actions
when it had to be present continually in committee work as an administrative office -
- on the side, without any significant pay as officials -- practically put the further
labors of the Danube movement out of order as a movement.
*
If in this three-year period, technically little happened with the barrage, further
outside connections cannot be left aside.  In fall 1989, the East European communist
powers collapsed like dominoes: this was the time of the disappearance of the Berlin
Wall, and in Czechoslovakia and Romania we  witnessed  fast  personnel  changes.
And just as in Hungary during the short Grósz era replacing Kádár, in Slovakia, too,
the barrage heralded like a sensitive instrument what was behind the new power's
words.
8.  INTERPARTY SKIRMISHES?  (MAY 1990-APRIL 1991)
Although  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  situation  of  the  barrage  this  is  not
justified, we will continue the first year of the period of the Hungarian change of
regime and government as a separate sub-section.  It is not the events tied to the
barrage, but rather the expectations tied with it, that had changed by this time.
In 1990, western observers sensitive to environmental questions generally took it
for granted that in Eastern Europe, where the environmental movements played such
a significant role in motivating the masses, and through this in eliminating the old
regime, now the development of environmental consciousness had begun.  Here at
home too, everyone counted on the emerging new parties to pay more attention to
environmental  problems  than  the  previous  policy-makers  did.    Various  parties
included those very people, often in leading positions, who had fought to the end in
actions against the barrage.
A few important declarations, promises and slogans on environmental protection
made their way into party programs.  But the closer the elections came, the fewer
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their  profiles,  and  it  became  very  important  for  them  to  begin  to  differentiate
themselves as markedly as possible from the other parties.  A few stock-phrases tied
to  the  environment  were  not  too  useful  for  this,  and  these  often  were  more  in
agreement with other parties' similar environmental programs and phrases than with
the economic policies of their own party.
As mentioned above, one of the institutional bastions on the side of finishing the
barrage was the Environmental and Water Management Ministry, formed in 1988 at
the time when the movement was spreading.  This forced marriage of the elimination
and formation of the new ministry was not questioned.  In the course of execution,
the new government noted, and it was lost in the background, that in the course of
separation  the  lobby,  in  essence  the  water  management  leadership,  remained
unchanged, joined together.  Only it was turned over to the transportation portfolio
(from which in exchange the construction and settlement development were joined
with environmental protection).  Otherwise, more generally it is true that in contrast
to  the  new  and  inexperienced  political  leadership,  the  various  industrial  lobbies
remained on their feet and so they grew relatively stronger.
The relative strengthening of the lobbies became manifest in how easily they
were  capable  of  blackmailing  the  government,  because  it  was  missing  those
politicians who knew and could see through the principles.  This "specialization"
could be supplemented precisely by the lobbies, and a longer time and expensive
learning money was necessary for them to be detected and for a new, politically
maintainable balance to develop.
Until  then  the  kind  of  money-divying  struggle  continued,  confronting  the
government  with  fait  accompli  situation,  making  them  jump  into  cheap  and
attractive-seeming investments, and prepare for situations without alternatives, as the
Gabcikovo(Bôs)- Nagymaros power station symbolized.  Within this, the barrage
become by this time a lucky exception that, because of its symbolic political content,
had already discredited itself to such an extent that on this question not a single
political force could allow itself to step back.
Still  the  government's  recognition  of  this  was  not  explicable  in  itself.    In
September  1990,  when  in  a  pretty  unfortunate  way  just  the  opposition  parties
recommended to the parliament that the earlier, too open government authorization
tied  with  the  barrage  be  made  unambiguous,  and  that  the  intent  to  destroy  the
construction be stated, the motion fell apart along rigid party lines, and the governing
parties blocked the introduction of the question on the agenda.  The proposal would
come forward again only in April 1991, when it could count on the support of all the
party  fractions,  and  thus  the  parliament  opened  the  way  for  the  government
delegation at the talks with the Slovak partner to unambiguously come down on the
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With this, on the Hungarian side, the two-year-long, formally open period of
suspension reached an end, and at least at Nagymaros the preparatory works to return
the channel to its original state began, admittedly mostly at the drafting tables.  From
the point of view of the barrage, the whole period was characterized by a "we can
talk about everything, only do nothing" principle, which in a peculiar way the change
of regime did not change.
9. HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT VERSUS SLOVAK GOVERNMENT (APRIL 1991-?)
Has  the  Hungarian  government's  policy  truly  moved  beyond  this  stalemate-
principle, or has the confrontation merely moved onto a new plane?  It is difficult to
answer this question even today.  Two different scenarios can be traced in relation to
this.
According  to  the  first,  like  many  new  governments  in  Eastern  Europe,  the
Hungarian  government  has  more  confidence  in  the  basis  of  its  legitimacy  on  a
nationalist-national foundation than its own deeds.  According to this, to maintain the
tension with Slovakia, to address it harshly, make reference to it but at the same time
solve nothing, is the tactic that according to its own notions makes the government
popular, and which makes even a confrontation with the water management lobby
unnecessary.
Unfortunately,  on  the  other  side,  too,  there  is  the  readiness,  and  indeed  the
attempt, to develop such a conflict.  This behavior offers a certain protection against
further common work on the barrage in the short term; in reality, however, it forms a
more serious policy leading to certain failure.
According to another scenario, to which there is less susceptibility in the region,
if the government is not preparing for an eternity in power, then what will be done in
the interest of eliminating the problems really will depend on the new elections. For
this, it is not an answer to the question of "why not," that is necessary to prepare but
instead to help along the solution of the problems and, in our case, the consequences
of the mistaken plan.
In  the  interest  of  this  a  decisive,  purposeful  step  would  be  necessary  on  the
Hungarian side, avoiding statelemates and endless confrontations.
It  is  unfortunate  that  today  the  tactics  on  both  sides  are  determined  by
declarations that are either belived advantageous for the authorities domestically, or
belived advantageous from the point of view of the western image.  The Hungarian
government thinks that the ecological viewpoints it has chosen, and its intent to carry
out a modern reexamination of the mistaken decisions, ensures western sympathy for
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government, however, thinks that the fact that Slovakia in any case hold itself to a
concluded agreement, is such European behavior that the west will somehow respect
it, and will even express this with material support.  Thus, from time to time it comes
up that the questions under debate should be handled by approaching international
professional arbiters: naturally, by "professional" one side means ecologists, while
the other has in mind hydraulic builders and lawyers.
Neither side reckons that a specialist having any self-respect would step back if
s/he recognizes what kind of political battles his or her expertise is to be used to
fight.  The danger that mostly those "specialists" will remain on the ground who in
return for necessary payment are likely to support any point of view, and the course
of  decision-making  will  not  reach  an  end  with  this;  only  costly  lobbying  will
develop, which will only deepen the conflict and not lead in the direction of its
solution.
It  is  not  only  impossible  professionally,  but  noting  the  international  political
stage, it would be a baseless expectation, or illusion, that international professional
organizations could take a position as arbiters in an internal conflict between two
East European states.  (It is particularly baseless to suggest that someone should give
material aid to one country in opposition to the other's conceptions.)  In itself, this
sheds a very bad light on the two countries, which in opposition to one another try to
lobby in the interest of a solution more advantageous to them by leaning on their
own  "greater  Europeanness."    At  the  same  time  it  is  obvious  that  the  proof  of
Europeanness would be if the two countries could come to a consensus in an adult
way and through their own efforts.  It is also absolutely clear that the professional
and material support would start when and if this agreement comes about.  It would
be much more cultured to turn this aid really to correcting the mistakes committed by
the previous regime than to sacrifice it on the altar of unproductive arbitrational
specialists' opinions.
Otherwise we could point out that there is no professional (technical, economic,
ecological, legal, etc.) question affecting the bases for judgment of further tasks, for
which the professional knowledge useful to one country or the other would not be
sufficient to provide the answer.
If international consultations are justified in continuing, then they would be the
method for handling conflict, for leading talks toward consensus.  Because of the
fashionable content of the problem, it could turn into the newest example of research
(the ecological field, paradigm difference, international players in political changes
of regime, the East European background).  In this case, the scientific preparation
would be international, a few conditions with preliminary assurances (the choice of
persons who are competent and informed, and at the same time capable of forming
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an internal matter, in which, with its result, the sides would appear jointly in the
wider international arena.
...not the end...
12.  RECENT  PERIOD.    WATER  MANAGEMENT  VERSUS  ENVIRONMENTAL  MOVEMENT,
AGAIN?
The history of the Danube dam itself has not been coming to an end, so it is very
difficult to finish this story.
On the 24. of October, 1992 the Slovakian water management closed the Danube
and begin to alter the waterflow to the side-channel constructed by the "variant C".
As on the surface one can hear more and more about the Hungarian - Slovakian
debates, about the international conflict, and about the attempt of the EC to lead the
conflict to a peaceful end, it can be surprising that it is the returning opposition
between the management and the environmentalists that has been chosen as title for
the  recent  half  year.  The  cause  for  it  is,  that  the  pro-dam  part  of  the  water
management was the main power that could feel a hope to gain again looking the
successfully frizzed development of the matter for years, and by now this group
seems to be more active again.
It is a quite controversial, but very characteristic nature of the debate. As the first
step  there  was  an  increasing  impatience  in  the  public  opinion  because  of  the
unchanged situation, accusing the government and the movement too who were not
able to promote a more rapid reconstruction. In November being troubled by the
Slovakian action of closing the Danube at first several government officer tried -
exploiting this dissatisfaction - to shift upon responsibility to the movements as they
would not give good advices to the government to avoid the Slovakian action. The
pro-dam propaganda recently has tried to continue accusing the movement stating
that they would have been the cause of the whole problem because they promoted to
stop  the  construction.  Naturally  in  a  strict  sense  this  is  true:  if  nobody  had  had
protested against the senseless projects, then this kind of conflict wouldn't have been
occurred. In the same time this argument lead us to the necessity of re-examining the
actual conflict situation.
The  Slovakian  dam-builders  continued  to  force  the  accomplishment  of  the
original agreement and since, in spite of their best hopes, they were not able to alter
the Hungarian opinion, captured by their own strategy they were driven to fulfil the
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The action of the Slovakian water management was hastened by the political
situation as same as by natural endowments. Political reason was beside the above-
mentioned ones the separation of the Czech and the Slovakian state, as this would
have given another occasion for a legal-political debate at the beginning of 1993
when  the  sustain  of  the  original  contracts  needed  a  re-confirmation.  The  natural
reason was, that the closing and alteration of the river is not possible but at a very
low water-level, and this arrives on the Danube traditionally at the second half of
October.
The fulfilment of the action make possible to draw several lessons from it. As for
the technical lessons one could state that the action was a rash and thoughtless one,
the  construction  was  not  well  prepared  and  ready  and  the  whole  action  was  a
hazardous one. It kept for months just to finish the technically indispensable works
to ensure the minimal technical security, and this work has not been ended yet. A
medium-size food in November swept away three iron-gates, the flood gates have
not operated, there was no possibility to let down the water to the original branch. A
badly manoeuvering tow-boat fully loaded with rocks has been sank in November
closing several gates for a longer time. These mistakes proves the argument, that the
too early operation was not a well considered action but an irresponsible one.
For the general argumentation there are more important proofs that verify such
mistakes that would relate the operation of the original project too. From this point
of view the whole operation can be considered as an irresponsible experiment in the
original size and site. Since it is not our task to give detailed argumentation for the
debate itself, here we just mention the sank ground-water level, as a consequence of
it the problems of the vegetation and the different ecosystems; the pollution of the
water in the original river bed, in the reservoir and in the side channel covered with
asphalt;  the  changes  in  the  stream  deposit  balances;  and  other  consequences  of
similar significance. (The expected dangerous consequences were foreseen by the
Ecological Institute of Slovakian Academy of Sciences too.)
Turning back to the international conflicts, the Slovakian argument states, that
the only valid agreement would be the one signed in 1977. Both the suspension of
the works in 1989 and the official ceasing of the agreement in 1992 would have been
one-sided Hungarian steps, not accepted by the Slovakians, so these actions would
not have been existing in legal terms. But the construction of the "variant C", the
alteration  of  the  frontier  river,  the  one  sided  divertion  of  the  water,  even  if  the
construction did not fit to the agreement, would aim at the realisation of the original
idea, so it would be legal.
The Hungarian argument states just the opposite - not denying the responsibility
for signing the agreement and assuming the consequences of it up to 1989, or partly
up to 1992. The debate should be decided bilaterally, but if it is not possible, the two
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The author's opinion is that the decision of this original debate over the contract,
and over the consequences of the ceasing of the agreement should not have been
mixed with a second and quite different question. The protest against the physical
aggression,  that  is  against  the  alteration  of  the  frontier  river  and  against  the
appropriation of the water and the common part of the construction would not need
further  Slovakian  approval,  and  the  Hungarian  government  should  have  express
immediately his protest for that before international forum, among other to make it
clear, that it is not to be mixed with the questions debated and legally acceptable.
It is to be seen that both governments are captured by internal political pressures.
There is very weak chance to change this determination. But even more clear, that
the EC too has special determination. After getting involved into this inconvenient
matter, the most important aim is to have the appearance of creating a solution. To
achieve  this  aim  they  are  pressed  to  accept  any  solution  independently  of  its
contents. What is practical in such a case: to put pressure on those side that present
any willingness to accept a compromise. In the case of a mixture of legal debates and
physical aggression, above analysed in details, there is a great danger of the support
of the aggression for the sake of a successful short-term conflict resolution. The
common lesson of the EC arbitration and the Hungarian government to avoid this
special trap.
To give a more optimistic perspective of the whole story we would like to draw
the attention to a second periodicity of the events. The first one was the political
periodicity:  as  the  more  strict  periods  of  the  political  dictatorship  were  always
associate with an accelerating construction of the dam, while the more liberal periods
made possible a kind of re-thinking.
The second periodicity follows rather a natural cycle. In the fall of 1988 the
Hungarian Parliament voted for the construction of the dam. Later it turned out to be
more  determining  for  the  parliament  than  for  the  dam.  In  spring,  1989  the
government suspended the construction. In that fall the parliament could not decide
but prolonged further examinations. Next spring the new government declared his
ambition to follow the ecological priorities, but in that fall the parliament had no
willingness to reinforce this ambition with an unambiguous decision. This decision
has been born by the spring of 1991. This fall the movement of the government
seemed to be very irresolute as keep on tried to avoid the ceasing of the contract, but
after  several  postponed  ultimatum  the  spring  of  1992  brought  this  step.  As  the
consequences of the Slovakian aggression the Hungarian opinion seemed to be softer
again by the fall of 1992.
In  the  first  days  of  1993  in  the  frame  of  a  more  extent  government  re-
organisation the Hungarian prime minister changed all the three ministers officially
dealt with the Danube dam, and whose role and intention were very different in this
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belongs to (the head of the water management has been changed two months earlier);
the environmental minister and a minister plenipotentiary without special portfolio
dealing with the Danube negotiations. In the recent period the role of the foreign
minister seemed to be increasing in connection with the dam.
February, 21. 1993.
10.  SUMMARY
There were many who at the time of the change of regime, based on the behavior
they witnessed, overestimated the  ecological  consciousness  of  the  East  European
masses.  These observers, whether they were analyzing the events from the west or
on the spot, expected the birth of ecologically centered societies in Eastern Europe,
and in the end they were disappointed in their expectations.  It must still be stated
that in Eastern Europe today, there still is not a real mass demand for all this.
The difference can perhaps be characterized with the difference that appears in
the background symbolism of the movement against the barrage and of the western
anti-nuclear  movements.    The  barrage,  the  monster  made  of  concrete,  was  the
unintended symbol of political power running rampant over everything.  It signified
the model of totalitarian party rule.
The  anti-nuclear  movements  also  carry  a  very  definite  symbolic  content,  for
atomic  energy  means  a  much  more  refined  direction  and  control  on  a  high
technological level.  The struggle directed against it symbolizes disillusionment with
industrial society, a revolt against the value system of industrial society, on the soil
of a somewhat environment- friendly, post-industrial value system, all rolled into
one.
Doubtless the environmental defenders of the East European countries have as
their  goal  this  same  world  of  ideas,  the  priority  of  ecological v a l u e s ,  a s  t h e i r
colleagues  from  more  developed  countries.    Next  to  the  appreciation  for
environmental viewpoints has come, on a conscious level, the globalization of this
sphere of questions as a result, that is the understanding that we live in a common
world,  and  must  solve  our  problems  in  common.    This  outlook  doubtless  turns
environmental protectionists into professional partners with the goal of analyzing
conflicts and solving conflicts.  At the same time it must be taken into account that at
present,  the  questions  before  the  East  European  societies  of  the  transition  from
central direction to a market economy form the main problems to be solved, and they
are  not  identical  with  the  sphere  of  questions  connected  with  the  surpassing  of
industrial  society.    Many  signs  point  to  the  fact  that  these  societies  are  moving
toward the merciless capitalism of the last century, struggling with the post-feudal
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awareness side, but sociologically the values related to dismantling the industrial
society are moving only a bit: in many cases, the problems that will sweep across
society,  and  which  must  be  put  behind  us,  have  not  even  formed  yet  --  we  are
thinking  here  of  the  concentration  of  data  brought  into  being  by  a  high-level
information network, or the concentration of modern technology in the hands of a
few people.  (It is no accident that in the west this came to be the focus of battle for
the anti-nuclear movement.)
At the same time, there is a very great need for all the lessons that the anti-
barrage movement carries to become an organic and conscious part of wide layers of
society and the politicians of the East European countries.  Up to now, even those
politicans who wanted to take advantage of the barrage movement seem not to have
recognized the significance of the symbolism behind it.  Otherwise they would have
realized that precisely on the political level the barrage can be used only in one
direction.
The barrage politically signifies the large, central investments of the old regime.
The politicians and political forces not beliving and recognising this fact, have only
ranged themselves along this scale.
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